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Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation
INTRODUCTION
Discrimination in housing is pervasive throughout American hous-
ing markets.' The Kerner Commission named segregation in housing
as an ingredient of the explosive mixture accumulating in cities since
World War II.2 Until very recently, housing discrimination has been
openly practiced by landlords, builders, developers, realtors, lenders,
and government.3 However, it is now "the policy of the United States
to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing through-
out the United States."4 Despite a host of laws prohibiting housing
related discrimination, housing markets have remained closed to mi-
nority groups.5 Widespread discrimination persists, both public and
private, and residential segregation has remained a fact of life.
6
The thirteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is the
primary constitutional basis for legislation designed to prohibit racial
discrimination 'in housing.7 The fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws, and has
been applied in order to prohibit discrimination in housing.8 The Civil
Rights Act of 1866' guarantees equal contract rights' and equal prop-
erty rights." More recent legislative responses to housing discrimina-
1. R. MONTGOMERY & D. MANDELKER, HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 355 (2d ed. 1979).
2. REPORT, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
3. UNITED STATES COMMISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 99
(1975).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976); e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
5. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 8.1 (1980).
6. D. MANDELKER, C. DAYE, 0. HETZEL, J. KUSHNER, H. MCGEE & R. WASHBURN, Hous-
ING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 559-62 (1981).
7. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Zuch
v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afd without opinion, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir.
1977).
8. E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); United Farmworkers of
Fla. Hous. Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aft'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
11. Id. § 1982.
1
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tion problems are Executive Order 11063,12 Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,13 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,14 the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act,' 5 and the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974.16 However, even with such an arsenal of laws
designed to prohibit housing related discrimination, housing discrimi-
nation continues to flourish and nonenforcement of the housing laws
remains a paramount obstacle to the elimination of discrimination in
housing and housing related services.' 7
Important preliminary issues faced by housing litigants are proce-
dure, standing, and standard of proof. Problems of procedure and
standing often baffle housing litigants and serve as major preliminary
obstacles which must be overcome prior to having the case heard on its
merits. Problems concerning the requisite standard of proof also serve
as significant obstacles, since it is necessary to determine what standard
of proof is to be applied in order to properly investigate and develop a
housing discrimination case. While the Supreme Court has announced
the appropriate standard of proof for constitutional claims'" and for
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1981,19 it has yet to provide
such guidance for claims brought under the Fair Housing Act. The
circuit courts are generally in accord that some forms of discriminatory
effect are sufficient to prove a violation of the Fair Housing Act.2 °
This Comment will focus on issues of procedure, standing, and stan-
12. 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63 compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. Id. §§ 3601-3619.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
17. See generally Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159 (1973);
Comment, The Fair Housing Act of 1968: Its Success and Failure, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1312
(1975).
18. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolican Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
19. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982). Since 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982 have been interpreted to be companion statutes, the Court will probably require
proof of intent or purpose to prove a violation of§ 1982. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
But see City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), where the Court declined to require
proof of intent under § 1982.
20. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co.,
672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) [Arlington Heights II]; Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). But see Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 896 (1975). See generally Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 199 (1978); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing
Act. A Search for the Proper Standard, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 398 (1978); Comment, Applying the
Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127 (1976).
2
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HO USING DISCRIMINA TION
dard of proof with emphasis placed primarily on the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. section 1982, and the fourteenth amendment. Part I will
present a brief overview of some early housing discrimination cases
and will outline the coverage of the major housing discrimination laws.
Part II will analyze the various procedural avenues available and will
assess the alternative enforcement mechanisms. Part III traces the issue
of standing, including the constitutional requirements. Part IV ana-
lyzes standard of proof issues, with an emphasis on the developing
models of the "effects test" under the Fair Housing Act.
I. OVERVIEW OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A. Early History
As early as 1917, the Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley2' unani-
mously held that a municipal ordinance which denied blacks the right
to occupy houses on predominantly white blocks violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Harmon v. Tyler,22 the
Court unanimously invalidated an ordinance which prevented the es-
tablishment of any home in a community without the written consent
of a majority of the persons of the other race inhabiting the commu-
nity. In Shelley v. Kraemer,23 the Court held that state judicial enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants was state action violative of the
fourteenth amendment. In Hurd v. Hodge,24 a companion case to Shel-
ley, the Court held that a racially restrictive covenant violated 42
U.S.C. section 1982. In Barrows v. Jackson,25 the court held that dam-
ages could not be awarded by a state court for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant. Much later, in Mayers v. Ridley,26 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that racially restrictive cove-
nants violated the Fair Housing Act.2 7
Many recent cases have held that, upon a finding of intentional dis-
crimination, the denial of housing and housing related services is viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment where
state action is present.28 In Reitman v. Mulkey,29 the Court held uncon-
stitutional as a violation of equal protection a state constitutional
amendment giving individuals discretion to discriminate in the sale or
21. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22. 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
23. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
25. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
26. 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
28. See cases cited supra note 8. But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Citizens
Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsey, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1974).
29. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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rental of property. In Hunter v. Erickson,30 the Court held that a mu-
nicipal ordinance requiring referendum approval of any city council
action that involves racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in
housing violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
However, with the enactment of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, the
fourteenth amendment is no longer the primary means of attacking
housing discrimination.
B. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act is a "broad legislative plan to eliminate all
traces of discrimination within the housing field."'" The Fair Housing
Act represents the most important, comprehensive and far-reaching
measure to combat housing discrimination to date.3" Through the Fair
Housing Act, Congress declared fair housing to be a national policy33
which it considered "to be of the highest priority."34 Fair housing has
been defined as "the achievement of a condition in which individuals
of similar income levels in the same housing market area have a like
range of housing choices available to them regardless of their race,
color, religion, national origin or sex."35 "[Elven the most conservative
definition of fair housing will necessarily involve the eradication of
discrimination. '"36
Seeking to produce "truly integrated and balanced living patterns,
37
the Fair Housing Act prohibits a wide range of discriminatory housing
practices. It prohibits a refusal to sell, rent, negotiate, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny a dwelling on the grounds of race, color, sex,
or national origin.38 The Fair Housing Act proscribes discrimination
in the terms, conditions, or privileges in the sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provisions of services or facilities in connection therewith.39 It
prohibits discriminatory advertising, ° misrepresenting the availability
30. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
31. Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974).
32. Chandler, supra note 17, at 174; Note, Is the United States Committed to Fair Housing? 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 641, 643 (1980). See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
34. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
35. Spencer, Enforcement of Federal Fair Housing Law, 9 URn. LAw. 514 n.3 (1977)(citing
Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Oppor-
tunity, News Release, June I1, 1971).
36. Chandler, supra note 17, at 164 n.36.
37. 114 CONG. REV. 3422 (1968) (Statement by Senator Walter Mondale).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), affdas modified,
509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976).
40. Id. § 3604(c). Eg., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972). See Annot., 22 A.L.R. Fed. 359 (1972).
4
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HO USING DISCRIMINATION
of a dwelling,4' and the inducement or attempted inducement of sales
by representations of the present or future racial composition of the
area.42 The Fair Housing Act also proscribes discrimination in the fi-
nancing of housing43 and in the provision of brokerage services. 4  It
prohibits interference, intimidation, or coercion of any person exercis-
ing rights granted by the Act.45 Section 3631 of the Act provides crimi-
nal sanctions for anyone who uses force or the threat of force to
willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with someone exercising rights
under the Act. The Act also prohibits racial steering, which is the pro-
cess whereby buyers or renters are directed to different areas according
to their race.46  Section 3608 places certain administrative responsibili-
ties on the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) and further provides that HUD shall administer housing
programs in an affirmative manner to further the policies of the Act.
The Fair Housing Act covers all dwellings, 47 both public and private,
but the Act provides for certain exemptions. 4  These exemptions are:
(1) any single-family house sold or rented by its owner,49 (2) owner-
occupied dwellings occupied by no more than four families,5" (3) non-
commercial housing operated by a religious organization,5 and
(4) noncommercial lodgings operated by private clubs. 2
It is worth noting that the Court in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. 53 pointed out that the language of the Fair Housing Act
is "broad and inclusive" and that the Act is to be generously construed.
Numerous lower courts have given the Fair Housing Act the broadest
possible construction. 4
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976). E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). This is commonly known as blockbusting. E.g., United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afd without opinion, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976). Eg., Dunn v. Mid-western Indemnity Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp.
1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. and Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio
1976).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976).
45. 1d. § 3617. E.g., United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1976),
aff'dinpart, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972 (1982); Smith v. Stechel, 510
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975); Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1982).
46. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979); Note, Racial Steering.: The Real Estate Broker and
Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809 (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1976).
48. Id. § 3603(b)(1).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
51. Id. § 3607.
52. Id.
53. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. Id. at 209. Eg., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir.
5
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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1982
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, all United States citizens are
guaranteed the same rights as are enjoyed by white citizens to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.55 As
compared with the Fair Housing Act, section 1982 provides a broader
coverage of transactions, but it prohibits discrimination only as to
race.5 6 In Jones v. Mayer,57 the Court breathed new life into section
1982 by holding that it barred all racial discrimination, private as well
as public, in the sale or rental of property. In Jones, the Court noted
that Title VIII and section 1982 provide separate and independent cov-
erage. 8 Section 1982 has been used successfully to attack increasingly
complex housing discriminating problems. In Clark v. Universal Build-
ers, Inc. ,9 the court held that section 1982 was violated where the de-
fendant exploited minority housing markets. In Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc. ,6 the Court held that both a white homeowner and
a black tenant stated a claim under section 1982 where a neighborhood
park blocked the assignment of the park membership to the tenant on
racial grounds.
D. Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 prohibits discrimination in
any program receiving federal financial assistance. Title VI has been
held to prohibit discrimination in housing where the requisite federal
financial assistance is present.62 Title VI exempts programs where the
only federal assistance is insurance or guaranty;63 therefore, Title VI
does not cover a significant portion of housing.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
56. E.g., Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Ass'n,
Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1974); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
57. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
58. Id. at 415-17. See generally Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section
1982, 22 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1969); Note, Racial Discriminaton in the Private Housing Sector.- Five
Years After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289 (1973). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969).
59. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
60. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See also Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex 1969).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
62. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th
Cir. 1974); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v. HUD,
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
6
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II. PROCEDURE: ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, OR BOTH
Issues of procedure often baffle housing litigants at an early stage,
since there is such a wide range of procedural avenues available. If one
proceeds under the fourteenth amendment, or under 42 U.S.C. section
1981 or section 1982, he may only seek redress through private litiga-
tion.64 Under the Fair Housing Act, Title VI, or Executive Order
11063, discriminatory housing practices may be attacked through ad-
ministrative complaints. However, one may pursue concurrent judicial
and administrative proceedings. This section of the Comment will fo-
cus on the alternative enforcement procedures of the Fair Housing Act.
The Fair Housing Act provides for three avenues of relief: (1) section
3610 provides for administrative complaints to HUD and subsequent
court action if necessary, (2) section 3612 provides for private civil ac-
tions, and (3) section 3613 provides for a civil action by the United
States Attorney General.
A. 42 U.S. C § 3610. Administrative Complaint
Under section 3610(a), any "aggrieved person," defined as any per-
son who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur, may file a writ-
ten complaint with HUD.65 The complaint must be filed within 180
days of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. HUD must con-
duct an investigation within thirty days of the receipt of the complaint
and must give written notice to the complainant concerning whether it
intends to attempt to resolve the complaint.66 If HUD decides to at-
tempt resolution of the complaint, it may only utilize "informal meth-
ods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. ' 67 In other words,
HUD has no enforcement authority.68
Whenever a state or local fair housing law provides rights and reme-
dies which are substantially equivalent to those provided by the Fair
Housing Act, HUD must contact the appropriate state or local agency
and inform it of the complaint.69 HUD shall take no further action on
the complaint if the state or local agency has commenced proceed-
64. Congress has granted original jurisdiction to the United States District Courts to hear
civil actions to recover damages or secure equitable or other relief for the protection of civil rights.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976).
65. 24 C.F.R. §§ 105.1-.36 (1983) provides HUD's regulations governing administrative com-
plaint processing under 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
67. Id.
68. See 24 C.F.R. § 105.31 (1983); Spencer, supra note 35.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976).
7
McGuinness: Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
562 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
ings. ° If the conciliation efforts fail, the complainant may proceed to
federal court to enforce his rights.' The administrative complaint pro-
cedure is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil ac-
tion brought under section 3610.72
The lower courts are divided on the issue of when the thirty-day pe-
riod in section 3610(d) for filing a complaint begins to run. Some
courts have held that the complainant must file his court action within
sixty days of the filing of his administrative complaint.7 3 Other courts
have held that the complainant's thirty-day period commences upon
the complainant's receipt of HUD's notice of failure to conciliate the
case.7 4 HUD regulations 75 are consistent with the latter. The wise liti-
gant should certainly file his court action within sixty days of filing his
administrative complaint since it often takes HUD more than sixty
days to investigate a complaint.76
The section 3610 administrative process is generally regarded as in-
adequate as a meaningful measure to combat housing discrimination. 7
However, section 3610 does afford some advantages worth noting. 8
An attorney need not be retained to commence the administrative pro-
cess. Cost is relatively low and the filing process is simple. Even
though the administrative process often encompasses months, it is often
quicker than obtaining resolution through litigation under section
3612.
B. 42 U.S.C § 3612: Direct Private Litigation
Under section 3612, a complainant may file suit directly in federal or
state court without exhausting any administrative remedies. 79 The
Supreme Court noted in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. 80 that the private suit is the "main generating force" of the Fair
Housing Act. The statute of limitations under section 3612 is 180
70. Id., 24 C.F.R. § 105.19 (1983).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1976).
72. Smith v. Woodhollow Apartments, 463 F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Fair Hous. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Eastern Bergin County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976).
73. Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1978); Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78
(N.D. Fla. 1976); Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
74. Logan v. Richard E. Cormack & Assoc., 368 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Brown v.
Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
75. 24 C.F.R. § 150.16(a) (1983).
76. UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION: THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT 29 (1979). This report notes that it takes HUD an average of 118 days to complete
its investigation and notify the complainant.
77. Id. at 26-31. See generally Comment, supra note 17.
78. Chandler, supra note 17, at 189.
79. Oliver v. Foster, 524 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429
F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
80. 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
8
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days81 and is not tolled while the complainant pursues administrative
remedies under section 3610.82 An attorney may be appointed for a
plaintiff,83 and attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.84
Sections 3610 and 3612 create separate, independent, and alternative
enforcement mechanisms.85 Congress intended for HUD's conciliation
efforts under 3610 to occur concurrently with the pre-trial action under
3612.86 An election of remedies is not necessary 87 and an adverse find-
ing by HUD does not have a res judicata effect upon a section 3612
action.88 In most cases, it would seem prudent to proceed concurrently
under both sections 3610 and 3612.89
C. 42 U.S.C. Section 3613: Action by Attorney General
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 3613, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral may file a civil action whenever he has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation, or that there has been a denial of fair housing rights which
raises an issue of general public importance. To satisfy the pattern or
practice requirement, the discrimination must result from more than a
single isolated incident.9" The Attorney General is given wide discre-
tion as to whether an issue of public importance is raised.9' Actions by
the Attorney General under section 3613 have been successful in recent
years in enjoining housing discrimination,92 but section 3613 is only
used at the Attorney General's discretion. It is probably worthwhile to
inform the Attorney General of alleged housing discrimination since it
may possibly lead to a civil action under section 3613. Even if the At-
torney General fails to file an action, the investigatory activities will
likely bring added pressure on the defendant.
III. STANDING
The concept of standing has been recognized as among "the most
81. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976).
82. Smith v. Woodhollow Apartments, 463 F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1976).
84. Id. § 3612(c).
85. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104-08 (1979).
86. Young v. AAA Realty Co., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Johnson v.
Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 91 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See 24 C.F.R. § 105.31 (1983).
87. Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 90-91 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
88. Miller v. Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D. Col. 1976).
89. Comment, supra note 17, at 1319.
90. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 216-18 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
91. United States v. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1168 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. Eg., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mitch-
ell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
9
McGuinness: Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
564 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
amorphous in the entire domain of public law."93  Although the
Supreme Court has noted that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue
are largely worthless as such,"'9 4 it is necessary to outline the basic con-
tours of the standing doctrine in order to place the doctrine in perspec-
tive prior to specifically addressing standing in housing discrimination
cases. It is generally acknowledged that the doctrine of standing is con-
fusing and uncertain. 95 One commentator noted that standing "lacks a
rational conceptional framework. It is little more than a set of dis-
jointed rules dealing with a common subject."9 6 In housing discrimina-
tion cases, the Supreme Court has quite actively addressed standing
problems.97 Several of these housing cases serve as leading cases devel-
oping the doctrine of standing.9"
Simply stated, the question of standing concerns who may litigate.
Standing determines who is the proper party to present a claim in
court.99 "IT]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute. . . ."'I The standing
issue is the "threshold question in every federal case, determining the
power of the court to entertain the suit."'' Standing involves "a blend
of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations." 102
A. Constitutional Requirements
The standing doctrine has its jurisprudential roots in Article III, sec-
tion two of the United States Constitution, which limits the judicial
power of federal courts to the adjudication of "cases and controver-
sies. "1I3 The Supreme Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-
icans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. 104 concisely
outlined the minimum standing requirements:
93. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
94. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
95. Marshall and Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1981); Public Citizen,
Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 24.1 (2d ed. 1983); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing. A PleaforAbandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
96. Tushnet, supra note 95, at 663.
97. Schwemm, supra note 20.
98. E.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975).
99. E.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). Seegenerally 13
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3531 (1975).
100. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
101. Id.
102. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979).
103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; ValleyForge, 454 U.S. at 471; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
104. 454 U.S. at 472.
10
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[Alt an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes
the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some ac-
tual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant,' [citation omitted] and that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed, by a
favorable decision,' [citation omitted].
In order to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement, the Court
has required the plaintiff to allege "such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court
jurisdiction."'' 0 5 In Baker v. Carr,'1 6 the Court announced the personal
stake requirement and reasoned that a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy is necessary to "assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de-
pends ... .""' The Court identified this as the "gist" of the question
of standing.
The personal stake requirement consists of three elements: 1) injury
in fact, 2) causal connection between the injury and the defendant's
conduct, and 3) likelihood that the relief requested will redress the in-
jury. ' 8 Injury in fact requires that "the plaintiff must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant."0 9 The injury must be
"distinct and palpable.""' The injury may be economic or other-
wise." Perhaps the most liberal standing case involving non-eco-
nomic interests is United States v. SCRAP"12 where the Court noted
that "an identifiable trifle is enough for standing."' ' 3 The plaintiff's
injury in fact must be caused by the defendant's conduct. A "fairly
traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the chal-
lenged conduct must exist' '4 as well as a likelihood that the relief re-
quested will redress or prevent the injury.'
105. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
106. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
107. Id.
108. See generally Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Broderick, The Warth Optional
Standing Doctrine. Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467, 469 (1975); K. DAVIS,
supra note 95.
109. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 100; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
111. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74 (1978); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973); Ass'n of
Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
112. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
113. Id. at 689 n.14.
114. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); ArlingtonI,
429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977).
115. Arlington 1, 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977); Simon v. EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
11
McGuinness: Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
566 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
B. Prudential Limitations
In addition to the constitutional requirements, standing involves pru-
dential limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 6 These pru-
dential limitations are "principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated and to limit access to federal courts to those liti-
gants best suited to assert a particular claim."' '7 These prudential limi-
tations are derived from the notion that it is imprudent for courts to
hear certain cases, even though the plaintiff has established a case or
controversy." 8 The prudential limitations are founded on a concern
for the proper role of courts in a democratic society.19 These pruden-
tial rules are rules of judicial self-restraint and stand apart from the
constitutional requirement of standing. Courts are free to disregard the
prudential rules when appropriate. 12 0
In Valley Forge,12 the Court concisely outlined the prudential rules.
First, a plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights rather than
the rights of third parties.' 2 2 However, in major housing related cases,
the Court has allowed whites to assert the rights of black third parties.
In Barrows v. Jackson 123 a suit for damages for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant, whites were allowed to assert the constitutional
rights of blacks. The Barrows court reasoned that whites were the only
effective adversaries to combat the use of restrictive covenants. In
Buchanan v. Warley, 124 a white brought suit for specific performance of
a contract to sell real property to a black. The white seller was allowed
to challenge the validity of an ordinance barring black persons from
living on predominantly white blocks.
The second of the prudential rules requires that courts refrain from
hearing abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to
a "generalized grievance."'' 25  In United States v. Richardson126 and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,2 7 the Court held
116. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
117. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
118. South East Lake View Neighbors v. HUD, 685 F.2d 1027, 1034 (1982).
119. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
120. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 74 (4th ed. 1983).
121. 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
122. Arlington 1, 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). But see
discussion infra, concerning third party standing which has often been allowed in housing related
cases. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953). Technically, the Barrows line of cases does not directly relate to standing. See Brod-
erick, supra note 108, at 472.
123. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
124. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
125. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
126. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
127. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
12
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that parties who allege a grievance shared generally with the public
lack Article III standing. In O'Shea v. Littleton,'28 the Court stressed
that "[a]bstract injury is not enough."
The third of the prudential rules requires that the plaintiffs com-
plaint must be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. "129
The "zone of interests" test is often employed in cases brought under
the Administrative Procedure Act; 130 however, it is not limited to appli-
cation in administrative cases.'31
Congress may expand standing to the full extent permitted by Article
111.132 If Congress chooses to grant an express right of action, then
courts "lack authority to create prudential barriers to standing in suits
brought under" the statute. t 33 "Congress may enact statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no
injury would exist without the statute."'' 34 However, even if Congress
grants a statutory right of action to persons who would otherwise be
barred by prudential standing rules, the Article III minima remains.
Congress may not abrogate the Article III minima. 35  In Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 136 the Court held that Congress in-
tended standing under the Fair Housing Act to extend to the full limits
of Article III; therefore, courts lack authority to apply prudential barri-
ers in cases brought under the Fair Housing Act. In Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 37 the Court reaffirmed the principle that courts may
not create prudential barriers in suits under the Fair Housing Act.
C. Standing to Assert Third Party Rights
Separate from the general standing doctrine is the issue of standing
to assert the rights of third parties.'38 Of course, the general rule man-
dates that the plaintiff may only assert his own legal rights, not the
rights of third parties. 139 However, exceptions to the general rule have
been recognized where there are "weighty countervailing policies."'
41
128. 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1972).
129. See Association of Data Processing Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
131. Broderick, supra note 108, at 498.
132. Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
133. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
134. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
135. Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
136. Id. at 100, 103 n.9.
137. 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
138. See Broderick, supra note 108, at 471-73; Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
139. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972).
140. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960). The Court has recognized exceptions to
13
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Indeed, the Court has limited the circumstances under which one will
be allowed to assert third party rights.' 4 '
Generally, there must be some specific reason for considering the
rights of third parties.'42 One basis for allowing a litigant to assert
third party rights is where a beneficial relationship between the litigant
and the third party exists.' 4 3 The allegedly unlawful conduct must
"preclude or otherwise adversely affect a relationship existing between
[the litigant] and the persons whose rights assertedly are violated.""'
Such a situation involving a relationship between the litigant and the
third party will likely arise in the developer line of housing cases. De-
velopers often have a relationship with the prospective tenants of the
housing; they share a common interest in constructing the housing
project.
Another basis for asserting third party rights occurs when the litigant
is the only effective adversary to assert the third party's rights.145 Bar-
rows v. Jackson 146 is perhaps the leading case recognizing the assertion
of third party rights. In Barrows, the Court reasoned that whites were
the only effective adversaries to combat the use of racially restrictive
covenents. The Barrows Court noted that the rule against asserting
third party rights "is only a rule of practice [which may be] outweighed
by the need to protect the fundamental rights which would be de-
nied. . .. -14 " This exception to the rule against asserting third party
rights, where the litigant would be the only effective adversary, is par-
ticularly suited for complex housing discrimination cases. In those
cases, the third parties whose interests need protecting are the low-in-
come prospective tenants. Low-income prospective tenants are rarely
in a position to institute the necessary complicated litigation.
D. The Fair Housing Act
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing to sue under the
Fair Housing Act in three major cases. 148 In Trafficante v. Metropolitan
the general rule on several occasions. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 458-60 (1958); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1917).
141. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
142. 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3531, at
205.
143. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
144. Warih, 422 U.S. at 510.
145. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 257.
148. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See
generally Schwemm, supra note 20, at 213-25.
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Life Insurance Co. ,149 a black and a white tenant sued under section
810 of the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the defendants were commit-
ting discriminatory rental practices in violation of section 804 of the
Act. However, the plaintiffs did not claim to be the direct objects of the
discrimination. Their claimed injuries were: lost social benefits of liv-
ing in an integrated community; lost business and professional advan-
tages; and embarrassment and economic damage in social, business,
and professional activities from being stigmatized as residents of a
white ghetto. 5 ' The Court granted standing to the Trajffcante plain-
tiffs, noting that section 810 can be given vitality "only by a generous
construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit
who are injured by racial discrimination.""'5 The Trafficante plaintiffs
were asserting their interests in interracial association, and those inter-
ests were held sufficient to confer standing. They alleged that they
were injured by the discrimination directed against others which re-
sulted in their loss of the benefits of interracial associations.
In granting standing, the Trafficante Court relied on the legislative
history of the Fair Housing Act. The Court noted that "[tihe person on
the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory housing
practices."' 52 In supporting the Fair Housing Act, Senator Javits stated
that the Act would reach "the whole community."' 53 Trajfcante was
the first case brought under the Fair Housing Act to reach the Supreme
Court and was the first case to recognize that standing under the Act is
as broad as permitted by Article III.
It is most important to note that the basis for granting standing in
Trafficante derived from the Fair Housing Act. In enacting the Fair
Housing Act, Congress created legal rights. The invasion of those
rights confers standing. Therefore, Trafficante indicates the notion of
statutory standing under the Fair Housing Act.
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,154 the Court granted
standing to various plaintiffs who alleged racial steering in an action
under section 812 of the Act. The Gladstone plaintiffs were the munici-
pality of Bellwood, one black and four white residents of Bellwood,
and one black resident of the neighboring community of Maywood.
One of the plaintiffs living in Bellwood resided outside the affected
area 55 allegedly affected by the racial steering.I56 The plaintiff outside
149. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
150. Id. at 208.
151. Id. at 212.
152. Id. at 211.
153. Id. (quoting Senator Javits' speech in support of the Fair Housing Act, 114 CONG. REC.
2706 (1968)). The reach of the Act in this respect was later limited in Gladstone and Havens.
154. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
155. This affected area is known as the target area, which was identified as a 12-13 block area.
156. 441 U.S. 91, 95 n.3 (1979).
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the affected area and the plaintiff living outside Bellwood were denied
standing.
The Gladstone Court granted standing to the Village of Bellwood.
Bellwood had alleged that the defendant manipulated the city's racial
makeup through racial steering. 157 The Court noted that steering prac-
tices may reduce the number of homebuyers in the Bellwood housing
market. This may result in an exodus of white residents which may
reduce property values thereby diminishing the tax base and threaten-
ing the municipality's ability to bear the cost of local government. 58
The Court concluded that the municipality's interest in promoting inte-
grated housing was sufficient to satisfy Article III. The loss of Bell-
wood's racial balance and stability was held to be sufficient injury to
confer standing on Bellwood. 159
Extending Trafficante, the Gladstone Court held that residents in a
neighborhood have standing to sue where racial steering affects the
neighborhood's racial composition, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of
the professional and social advantages of living in an integrated
area. 6 ' The defendants contended that resident standing should be
limited only to those residing in a particular apartment complex, as in
Trafficante. However, Gladstone rejected that notion and held that res-
idents in the affected twelve-by-thirteen block residential neighborhood
had standing to sue. There is "no categorical distinction between in-
jury from racial steering suffered by occupants of a large apartment
complex and that imposed upon residents of a relatively compact
neighborhood such as Bellwood."'' The "relatively compact neigh-
borhood" area for standing was later reaffirmed in Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman. 162
The Gladstone case serves to both reaffirm and extend the reach of
Trafficante. Although Trafficante relied on the legislative history of the
Act, suggesting that the Act was to reach the "whole community," the
decision was limited to conferring standing on residents in the same
apartment complex. Gladstone extended this to include residents of a
relatively compact neighborhood.
Gladstone is also significant in that the Court noted that section 812
of the Act contains no restrictions on potential plaintiffs. 163 The Court
went on to note that one is entitled to seek redress under section 812 if
the plaintiff is "genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone's
157. Id. at 109-10.
158. Id. at 110-11.
159. Id. at 111.
160. Id. at 115.
161. Id. at 114.
162. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
163. 441 U.S. 91, 103 (1979).
16
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§ 804 rights .. 164
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 65 the Court further broadened
the scope of standing under the Fair Housing Act. Havens opened a
clear avenue of redress for fair housing litigants by holding that test-
ers' 66 have standing to sue under the Act. In Havens, the Court also
granted standing to the fair housing organization HOME to bring an
action on its own behalf.
The plaintiffs in Havens were HOME, 67 a black actually seeking to
rent, and both a black and a white tester. The individual plaintiffs
claimed a Trafficante -type injury by alleging that they were deprived of
"important social, professional, business and economic, political and
aesthetic benefits of interracial associations that arise from living in in-
tegrated communities free from discriminatory housing practices."'
168
The black renter alleged that he had been deprived of the right to rent
real property in Henrico County.' 69 The black tester claimed that the
false information given her that apartments were unavailable caused
her specific injury in violation of Section 804(d).' 7 ° HOME alleged
that the defendant's steering practices "had frustrated the organiza-
tion's counseling and referral services, with a consequent drain on
resources." 17
The Havens Court held that section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act
confers "a legal right to truthful information about available hous-
ing.,1 72 A tester given false information concerning the availability of
housing has standing to sue since he "has suffered injury in precisely
the form the statute was intended to guard against."' 7 3 In Havens, the
white tester had been given truthful information and therefore had no
standing to sue as a tester. Havens reaffirms the Trafficante concept of
statutory standing. In enacting section 804(d), Congress conferred stat-
utory standing to secure the right to truthful information about avail-
able housing.
Havens also addressed the neighborhood standing issue, noting that
the injuries to neighborhood residents were similar to those in Glad-
164. Id. at 103 n.9.
165. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
166. Testers are "individuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment
pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices."
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
167. Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) was a non-profit corporation whose pur-
pose was to make equal opportunity in housing a reality in the Richmond Metropolitan area. Id.
at 368.
168. Id. at 369.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 373.
173. Id.
17
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stone. 17 4 However, the plaintiffs did not identify the particular neigh-
borhoods where they lived, and the complaint failed to demonstrate
how the defendant's steering practices had affected the plaintiffs neigh-
borhood. t 5 Therefore, the Court remanded the case to allow the plain-
tiffs to make the complaint more definite.
The Havens Court reaffirmed Gladstone by noting that standing had
been granted based on the effects of discrimination only within a rela-
tively compact neighborhood. The Havens Court pointed out that it
had not suggested that "discrimination within a single housing complex
might give rise to a 'distinct and palpable injury' . . . throughout a
metropolitan area."' 76 Therefore, the Court clearly indicated its reluc-
tance to extend neighborhood standing beyond that of a "relatively
compact neighborhood." 177
Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens outline the basic contours of
standing under the Fair Housing Act. Some of the numerous lower
court decisions involving standing under the Act are noteworthy and
will be discussed. Several cases considered whether neighborhood resi-
dents have standing to challenge various types of housing projects. In
Shannon v. HUD,78 the Third Circuit granted standing to black and
white residents and businessmen of a neighborhood to challenge fed-
eral funding of a housing project which they alleged would increase the
concentration of low income blacks in the neighborhood. The Shannon
Court reasoned that the housing project may adversely affect "their [the
plaintiffs'] investments in homes and businesses,. . . [and] the very
quality of their daily lives."' 7 9 The Shannon plaintiffs alleged that the
failure of HUD to consider the racial concentration in its funding deci-
sion was in violation of section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act. Other
cases have afforded standing to neighborhood residents to challenge
housing projects which may affect the racial balance of the commu-
nity.' 8° The Seventh Circuit in Alschuler v. HUD 8" recently granted
standing to neighborhood residents to challenge HUD's approval of
federal financial assistance to a housing project. However, in a similar
174. Id. at 376.
175. Id. at 377.
176. Id.
177. In an interesting lower court case, the court in Bond v. Regal, 530 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.
Wis. 1982), denied standing to various plaintiffs who did not reside within the target area. The
residents were not close enough to the apartment complex allegedly discriminating to be affected
by the discriminatory practices.
178. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
179. 1d. at 818.
180. See Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 500 F. Supp. 460, 463-65 (N.D. 11. 1980); Marin City
Council v. Marin County Redevelopment Agency, 416 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1975); East Chi-
cago Community v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 62, 66-67 (N.D. Ill. 1972); afid, 488 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1973). See also Brookhaven Hous. Coalition v. Solomon, 583 F.2d 584 (2d Cir 1978).
181. 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982).
18
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case, the Seventh Circuit in South East Lake View Neighbors v.
HUD'82 denied standing to residents to challenge HUD's decision to
fund a housing project since the construction of the project was virtu-
ally completed and the project was soon to be occupied. The court
reasoned that no form of judicial relief would redress the plaintiff's al-
leged injuries of congestion and noise.
Several interesting lower court cases explore the scope of standing of
various types of housing developers to challenge adverse decisions.
Some of the developer cases have been brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
sections 1981 and 1982 and are discussed in that section of this Com-
ment. In Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack,183 the Eighth
Circuit granted standing to housing developers to assert their own
rights because they had suffered direct economic injury. The court rea-
soned that "[i]t is as important to protect the rights of sponsors and
developers to be free from unconstitutional interferences in planning,
developing, and building an integrated housing project, as it is to pro-
tect the rights of potential tenants of such projects."' 8 4 The Park View
court also granted the developer plaintiffs standing to assert the rights
of prospective tenants of the proposed project under both the Fair
Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982.
In United States General v. City of Joliet, 85 the court granted stand-
ing to the plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the construction of low
income housing, to challenge the denial of building permits. The
plaintiff alleged that it had been interfered with in violation of 42
U.S.C. section 3617 as it attempted to aid others in the exercise of their
fair housing rights. The plaintiff clearly had standing to assert its own
rights due to the economic loss incurred as a result of its pre-construc-
tion expenditures. The court followed Park View and held that the
plaintiff had standing to assert the rights of prospective minority ten-
ants under the Fair Housing Act. However, the court noted that if the
plaintiff were to prevail, it would only recover for its own injury and
not for the injury to the third parties. 8 6 "[Dlevelopers are essential
participants in the growth of integrated public housing, and it is consis-
tent with the broad sweep of the Act to permit them to enforce its
prohibitions."'' 87
Section 3617 is a potentially powerful provision because it creates a
legal right not to be interfered with in the exercise of fair housing
rights. Section 3617 appears to be the strongest weapon for developers
182. 685 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1982).
183. 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
184. Id. at 1212.
185. 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. IU. 1977), afrd, 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979).
186. Id. at 353.
187. Id. at 354.
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to combat interference from municipalities or others. Section 3617 also
contains a jurisdictional provision sufficient to confer federal jurisdic-
tion if the provisions of sections 3610 or 3612 cannot be met.
In West Zion Highlands v. City of Zion t88 a case brought under the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982, and the equal
protection clause, the court granted standing to a low income housing
developer. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were maintaining a
discriminatory zoning ordinance that precluded the approval of a pro-
posed housing project. The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked
standing to sue since the Fair Housing Act did not seek to protect de-
velopers. The court rejected that notion and held that the plaintiff had
standing since it had suffered the requisite distinct and palpable injury.
"[A] person has an implied right of action against any other person
who, with a racially discriminatory intent, interferes with his right to
make contracts with non-whites. "189
In a case which has the potential to be a major breakthrough to de-
veloper plaintiffs, the Second Circuit in Huntington Branch NAACP v.
Town ofHuntington 190 granted standing to a developer seeking to chal-
lenge the town's zoning ordinance. The district court had denied
standing on the basis that the virtual absence of federal funding for
housing construction rendered the requested relief meaningless. The
Second Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiff had standing since it
was diligently seeking funding and that the possibility that funds would
become available in the future could not be excluded. The court
pointed out that "all that is required is a showing that such relief be
reasonably designed to improve the opportunities [for funding] of a
plaintiff. ... "19 To require the plaintiff to show more than that the
court's intervention would benefit him in a tangible way would be to
"close our eyes to the uncertainties which shroud human affairs."' 92 By
allowing a developer to attack an exclusionary zoning ordinance, with-
out a showing that the project financing is secured, may open a new
avenue of relief for developers.
E. Standing Under Sections 1981 & 1982'9 3
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of standing under sec-
188. 549 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. 11. 1982).
189. Id. at 676.
190. 689 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1982). See Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1416 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1983). Scott held that the many uncertainties which often surround the proposed construc-
tion of large-scale housing projects will not preclude the standing of developers.
191. Id. at 394.
192. Id.
193. Sections 1981 and 1982 are given a common interpretation. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). Since § 1981 is not limited to any particular type of
contract, it applies to property contracts covered under section 1982.
20
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 8
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/8
HO USING DISCRIMINATION
tion 1982 in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. 19' and in Warth v.
Seldin.195 In Sullivan, the Court granted standing to both a white
homeowner and a black tenant where a recreational park blocked the
assignment of a membership share due to the tenant's race. The Court
held that the defendant's action in blocking the assignment violated
section 1982 since it interfered with the right to lease.' 96 The white
lessor plaintiff had been expelled for attempting to lease his house to
the black tenant and was granted standing since his attempt to rent to a
black was interfered with by the defendant. In granting standing to the
white lessor, the Court reasoned that whites are sometimes the "only
effective adversary"'197 in such a case. Sullivan stands for the proposi-
tion that whites have standing under section 1982 where a defendant
interferes with his efforts to rent or sell housing to blacks. 98 Whites
may also have standing under section 1981.199
In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association z  the Court
granted standing to whites under sections 1981 and 1982. The Tillman
plaintiffs suffered no direct injury as did the plaintiff in Sullivan. In
Tillman, the plaintiffs belonged to a club which refused to admit their
black guests. Perhaps the most deadly blow to litigants seeking stand-
ing under sections 1981 and 1982 came in Warth v. Seldin.2°1 Of the six
Supreme Court housing discrimination cases which considered stand-
ing, Warth is the only case in which standing was denied. Housing
litigants proceeding under sections 1981 and 1982 should carefully con-
sider the Warth analysis in order to avoid its many pitfalls.
In Warth, a variety of plaintiffs sought to challenge the Town of
Penfield's zoning ordinance. The complaint alleged that the zoning or-
dinance had the purpose and effect of excluding low and moderate in-
come persons from the town in violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981,
1982, and 1983, and the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.
Warth involved four groups of plaintiffs: low and moderate income
minority persons who alleged that the defendant's exclusionary zoning
practices excluded them from Penfield; Rochester municipal taxpayers
who alleged that Penfield's exclusionary practices forced higher tax
rates on Rochester; developer and homebuilder associational plaintiffs
who alleged that they were blocked from building low and moderate
194. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
195. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
196. 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969).
197. Id. (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251 (1953)).
198. See Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971); Williamson v. Hamp-
ton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. (1972). See also Walker v. Pointer, 304 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
199. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
200. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
201. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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income housing in Penfield; and Metro-Act, a fair housing organization
which sought to promote low and moderate income housing. None of
the individual plaintiffs resided in Penfield.
All the Warth plaintiffs were denied standing. The primary issue
before the Court was whether the plaintiffs' inability to find housing in
Penfield reasonably could be said to have resulted from the defendant's
alleged infractions. The Court held that "a plaintiff who seeks to chal-
lenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him and that he per-
sonally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's interven-
tion."202 The low and moderate income minority plaintiffs alleged that
they were unable to find housing in Penfield. However, they were un-
able to establish an actionable causal relationship between Penfield's
zoning practices and their alleged injury.2"3 Justice Powell's opinion in
Warth stressed that there was no particular housing project at stake,
and the opinion distinguished Warth from similar cases which had
granted standing where a specific project was involved. 2"
It is most important to consider the critical distinction between
Warth and Trafficante. As discussed in Warth,2°5 Trafflcante was suc-
cessfully brought under the Fair Housing Act, while Warth was unsuc-
cessfully brought under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and 1983 and
several constitutional provisions. Consequently, fair housing plaintiffs
should file under the Fair Housing Act if standing is likely to be an
issue. A careful reading of Warth and Trafficante suggests that stand-
ing under sections 1981 and 1982 is more limited than under the Fair
Housing Act.
Another noteworthy point is that Warth required a more direct and
non-remote injury.20 6 Warth also required detailed factual allega-
2071 ic o fwrtions. Since some of the Warth plaintiffs were denied standing by
the exercise of prudential limitations, it is clear that courts may exercise
the prudential rules under sections 1981 and 1982. However, under the
Fair Housing Act, prudential rules may not be applied.0 8
Several courts have recognized standing under sections 1981 and
1982 for loss of association.0 9 In Walker v. Pointer,21° the court held
202. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
203. Id. at 507.
204. See id. at 507 n.17, 516.
205. Id. at 513-14.
206. See Broderick, supra note 108, at 509.
207. Id; see Wart/i, 422 U.S. at 501.
208. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
209. See Johnson v. Brace, 472 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Ark. 1979). See generally Comment,
Standing Under 42 U S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982: Direct, Indirect, And A New "Loss of Association"
Standing, 13 CONN. L. REV. 87 (1980).
210. 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
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that whites had standing under section 1982 where they were evicted
due to their association with blacks. Since the white plaintiffs' lease-
hold was interfered with because of their association with blacks, "they
should be as entitled to relief under section 1982 as if their skin was
black."21' In Woods-Drake v. Lundy,212 the Fifth Circuit held that
whites had standing under section 1982 where their landlord evicted
them because they had entertained black guests in their apartment.
The court also noted that when a landlord imposes on white tenants the
condition that they may not have black guests, the landlord has dis-
criminated against the tenants in the terms, conditions, and privileges
of rental; this is a violation of the Fair Housing Act.2 13 Several other
lower courts have followed Walker and granted standing to whites who
were denied housing or evicted because of their association with
blacks.2z 4
There are several recent cases of interest involving developer stand-
ing under sections 1981 and 1982. In Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water
District,u 5 the First Circuit granted standing to the developer plaintiff
to challenge the denial of a water permit for a low income housing
project. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant denied the water per-
mit because the plaintiff had contracted with blacks for the sale of
housing. In Des Vergnes, the First Circuit recognized that the plaintiff
had statutory standing to sue under section 1981. Des Vergnes was not
seeking to assert third party rights, rather he was seeking redress for
injuries to himself because he contracted with non-whites. In Gordon v.
City of Cartersville,216 the developer plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had interfered with his proposed housing project by denying building
permits and water line access to the project. The court granted stand-
ing and noted that "developers are often the only effective adversaries"
in this type of case.217 In Bendetson v. Payson,218 the court granted
standing to a developer who alleged that private individuals were inter-
fering with the plaintiffs efforts to provide low income housing.
211. Id. at 58.
212. 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
213. Id. at 1201.
214. Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844 (4th Cir.
1980); Oliver v. Foster, 538 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976). See also Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S.
409 (1968) (where the Court granted standing to both Mr. and Mrs. Jones; Mr. Jones was black,
but Mrs. Jones was white).
215. 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979).
216. 522 F. Supp. 753 (N. D. Ga. 1981).
217. Id. at 757.
218. 534 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1982).
23
McGuinness: Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
578 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
IV. STANDARD OF PROOF
A. Constitutional Standard
In order to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause, one must prove that the actions complained of had a
discriminatory intent or purpose.2 19 Village ofArlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp.22° was an exclusionary zoning
case where a virtually all-white Chicago suburb refused to rezone a
proposed housing site to accommodate low income housing. In Arling-
ton I, the Court identified several factors to be considered to determine
whether or not a discriminatory intent or purpose is present. 22' Those
factors are: (1) the discriminatory impact of the action, (2) the histori-
cal background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of ac-
tions taken for invidious purposes, (3) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departures from normal pro-
cedure, (5) departures from normal substantive criteria, and (6) the leg-
islative or administrative history of the decision, especially where there
are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports. "Determining whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive in-
quiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available. 222 A finding of intent is not limited to instances where deci-
sionmakers articulate some discriminatory purpose. "If proof of a civil
rights violation depends on an open statement by an official of an in-
tent to discriminate, the fourteenth amendment offers little solace to
those seeking its protection. 223 In Smith v. Town of Clarkton,224 the
Fourth Circuit recognized that officials seldom, if ever, make state-
ments revealing their discriminatory intent, and it is rare when such
statements can be captured for purposes of proving racial discrimina-
tion. However, as noted in Arlington J,225 persuasive evidence of intent
may be found in statements by decisionmakers or their agents. But, "as
overtly bigoted behavior has become unfashionable, evidence of intent
has become harder to find. 22 6 Statements indicating discriminatory
purpose need not directly indicate prejudice. "Camouflaged" racial ex-
219. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
Arlington 11; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
220. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
221. Id. at 266-68. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 1977);
Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 870-71 (E.D. Va. 1982).
222. 429 U.S. at 266. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3276 (1982).
223. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
224. 682 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1982).
225. 429 U.S. at 268.
226. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cit. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) Arlington II].
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pressions have often been relied upon in finding a discriminatory
purpose.227
"[A]n invidious discriminatory intent may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts. ' 228 A court should carefully analyze cir-
cumstantial evidence to determine if a racially discriminatory intent
may be inferred.22 9 In cases in which discriminatory intent may be in-
ferred from the sequence of events, courts have generally viewed sub-
jective explanations with considerable skepticism.230
The Court in Arlington 1231 noted that discriminatory impact may be
an important starting point in determining whether discriminatory in-
tent or purpose is present. In Washington v. Davis,2 32 the Court pointed
out that discriminatory impact "may demonstrate unconstitutionality
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds." In Columbus Board of Education v.
Pennick,2 3 3 the Court noted that actions having foreseeable and antici-
pated disparate impact are relevant evidence of discriminatory pur-
pose. Therefore, in addition to the more traditional forms of finding
intent, a court should consider whether the defendant has adhered to a
policy with knowledge of its predictable segregative effects.234 In Per-
sonnelAdministrator v. Feeney,23 5 the Court in dictum noted that inevi-
table adverse consequences of an official decision upon a minority lead
to a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired. "Certainly,
when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group are
as inevitable as the gender-based consequences [here], a strong infer-
ence that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn. '236
In fact, the Court in Palmer v. Thompson 237 strongly warned against
finding an action unconstitutional merely because of some illicit motive
of those who voted for it. Although Palmer was decided before Wash-
ington v. Davis, the basic Palmer principle remains valid. Discrimina-
tory intent may also be shown by a series of decisions which have a
segregative effect and result in a cumulation of disadvantages inexplic-
able on grounds other than an invidious basis.238
227. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982); Atkins v. Robinson, 545
F. Supp. 852, 872-74 (E.D. Va. 1982).
228. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). See Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 3276.
229. Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 870 (E.D. Va. 1982).
230. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cit. 1979).
231. 429 U.S. at 266. See Crawford v. Board of Educ. 102 S. Ct. 3211, 3221 (1982).
232. 426 U.S. at 242.
233. 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979).
234. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (N.D. Ohio 1980), af'd inpar,
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1720 (1982).
235. 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
236. Id.
237. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
238. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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In establishing discriminatory purpose, it is not necessary to prove
that the challenged decision rested solely on a discriminatory pur-
pose.239 "Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by
a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant'
or 'primary' one. "240 Therefore, a plaintiff need only show that a dis-
criminatory purpose has been one of the motivating factors involved.
Proof of discriminatory intent or purpose may also be established by
showing that the defendant's actions were taken to effectuate the dis-
criminatory purpose of others.24' Once a discriminatory purpose has
been shown, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a compelling
governmental interest. If the defendant fails to prove a compelling
governmental interest to justify its action, then the discrimination is
established.
B. Fair Housing Act Standard
A violation of the Fair Housing Act may be established under an
intent standard, and, under some circumstances, proof of discrimina-
tory effect alone may be sufficient.242 Courts must use their discretion
in deciding when proof of discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish
a violation.2 43 The traditional method of establishing discrimination is
through proof of discriminatory intent, purpose, or motive 4.2 4 Race
need only be one of the motivating factors in order to establish a viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act under the intent standard.245 "Race is an
impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision and it cannot be
brushed aside because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination
nor the total factor of discrimination. '"46 There is "no acceptable place
in the law for partial racial discrimination. 2 47 Consequently, it is not
necessary to prove that race was the sole or dominant motive, but race
must have been a factor to make out a case under the intent standard.
In housing discrimination cases, courts have used two different meth-
239. 429 U.S. at 265.
240. Id.; Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982).
241. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970). See also
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
242. Eg., United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a/fd as modi-
fied, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1720 (1982); United States v. Northside
Realty Ass'n, 474 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437
F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); See Arlington HI, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 20.
243. Arlington 11, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
244. See cases cited supra note 242.
245. E.g., Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982); Marble v. H. Walker and
Ass'n, 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
246. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970).
247. Id.
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ods to prove the presence of discrimination. First, courts have often
analogized to Title VII 248 and have applied a disparate treatment the-
ory.249 The disparate treatment theory was established in the Title VII
case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.25 Under the McDonnell
formula, the plaintiff must initially establish a prime facie case of dis-
parate treatment. A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by prov-
ing: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that he applied for and
was qualified for the job, (3) that he was rejected, despite his qualifica-
tions, and (4) that the position remained open after his rejection and
the defendant continued to seek applicants for the position.2 ' If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to "articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection. '' 25 2 If the defendant fails to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case, then the plaintiff prevails. If the defendant suc-
cessfully rebuts the prima facie case, then the plaintiff is afforded a
chance to establish that the defendant's explanation was merely a pre-
text for discrimination. The McDonnell formula is basically a method
of proving intent in an individual case.
Several courts have applied a McDonnell-type formula in housing
discrimination cases.253 A housing plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case by proving that the plaintiff is a minority, that he applied for and
was qualified to rent or purchase the housing, that he was rejected, and
that the housing remained available.254 The application of the McDon-
nell-type formula in housing cases has been limited to situations where
an individual is the victim, such as the typical refusal-to-rent case.
Cases involving broad class-based discrimination, such as exclusionary
zoning or rejection of public housing, entail an application of the Ar-
lington I test if an intent standard is being applied. The use of test-
ers,255 individuals who pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of
collecting evidence of discrimination, may be invaluable in establishing
a prima facie case under a disparate treatment theory. In Smith v.
Anchor Building Corp .,256 the court noted that where a black applicant
meets the objective rental requirements and the rental would likely
have been consummated if he were white, then a prima facie inference
248. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
249. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n., 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir.
1976).
250. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
251. Id. at 802.
252. Id.
253. See cases cited supra note 249.
254. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979).
255. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
256. 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976).
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of discrimination arises as a matter of law. If the inference is not satis-
factorily explained away, the discrimination is established.257 The
court reasoned that the rejection of an applicant meeting the objective
qualifications establishes a prima facie case of discrimination.
The "business necessity" defense from the Title VII cases258 has also
been asserted in housing discrimination cases. In Williams v. Matthews
Co ,259 the defendant claimed that his refusal to sell land to a black was
due to business necessity since he would only sell to approved builders.
The court rejected the business necessity defense in Williams, noting
that in order for a business necessity defense to prevail, the defendant
must "demonstrate the absence of any acceptable alternative that will
accomplish the same business goal with less discrimination. ' 260 Even
though the Williams court rejected the business necessity defense, it im-
plied that it might be successfully invoked under appropriate
circumstances.
The second method of establishing a violation of the Fair Housing
Act is through proof of discriminatory effect. 26 ' There are two primary
kinds of discriminatory effects:262 one where a decision has a greater
adverse impact on one racial group than another;263 the other where a
decision perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial asso-
21ciation. 6 In addition to the adverse impact theory, a discriminatory
effect may be established on a theory of "ultimate effect" or "historical
context; "265 however, this theory was identified in only one case and
was not explained. Since there is no distinct test for applying the "ulti-
mate effect" or "historical context" theory, it seems that the theory is
merely a method for determining adverse impact.
Numerous paramount considerations suggest that the discriminatory
effects test is the most appropriate standard of proof and the one in-
tended under the Fair Housing Act. Although somewhat sketchy, the
legislative history of the Fair Housing Act indicates that Congress in-
tended that a showing of discriminatory effect establishes a violation
even though the statute itself does not specify a standard.266 Congress
was clearly aware of the proof problems inherent in establishing dis-
257. Id.; Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974).
258. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
259. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
260. Id. at 828.
261. See supra note 20.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974); Comment,
Title VIII Litigation: The Demise of the Prima Facie Case Doctrine in the Seventh Circuit, 15 URB.
L. ANN. 325, 328 n.18 (1978).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) provides that in order to violate Title VIII, a housing practice must
be undertaken "because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
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criminatory intent or purpose. Several Congressmen spoke of the im-
portance of the Fair Housing Act in eliminating the adverse
discriminatory effects of past and present discrimination in housing.2 67
An even stronger indication that Congress favored a discriminatory ef-
fect standard is that the Senate rejected an amendment which would
have required proof of discriminatory intent to establish a Title VIII
claim.268 Senator Percy noted that proof of intent "would be impossible
to produce. 269
In addition to the legislative history supporting the discriminatory
effect standard, virtually all of the circuit courts have held that discrim-
inatory effect, at least under some circumstances, is the proper standard
of proof.27° The circumstances which justify the effect standard as the
appropriate standard of proof vary on a case-by-case basis. As the
court noted in Arlington II, "[w]e refuse to conclude that every action
which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. . . . Rather, the courts
must use their discretion in deciding whether, given the particular cir-
cumstances of each case, relief should be granted under the statute."' 27'
Logic suggests that initially a court would consider whether a case has
been established under the intent standard, since it is the traditional
method of proving discrimination. If there is insufficient evidence of
intent, then the court should determine if the effect standard has been
met. The analysis blends together since evidence of a discriminatory
effect is an important factor in determining if discriminatory intent is
present. Numerous federal district courts have held that discriminatory
effect is the proper standard. 27 2 In Arlington 11,273 the court noted that
a "strict focus on intent permits racial discrimination to go unpunished
in the absence of evidence of overt bigotry." The Fair Housing Act
was designed to prohibit "all forms of discrimination, sophisticated as
well as simple minded. '274 "Effect, and not motivation, is the touch-
stone because a thoughtless housing practice can be as unfair to minor-
267. See 114 CONG. REC. 2280 (1968) (remarks of Senator Brooke). See Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1977), affg 425 F. Supp. 987, 1022-23 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
268. 114 CONG. REC. 5214-22 (1968). See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147
(3d Cir. 1977).
269. 114 CONG. REC. 5216 (1968).
270. See cases cited supra note 20.
271. Arlington 11, 558 F.2d at 1290.
272. E.g., Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1982); United States v. City of
Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982); McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981); Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981); United States v.
Chicksaw Hous. Auth., 504 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Ala. 1980); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.
Supp. 1049 (N.D.Ohio 1980), aff'das modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1720 (1982); United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Fla. 1976); United States
v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
273. 558 F.2d at 1290.
274. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
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ity rights as a willful scheme. '27 5 Since "clever men may easily conceal
their motivations," effect is the proper standard of proof.27 6
Many courts277 applying an effect standard of proof have noted that
the "because of race" terminology of the Fair Housing Act is analogous
to that in Title VII. 218 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,279 the Court
adopted an effect standard of proof for Title VII. As Chief Justice Bur-
ger noted, Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices which are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. ' 280 In
United States v. City of Black Jack,281 the court noted that artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to housing must be removed, just as
Congress requires their removal in employment.
Although most courts have held that practices which result in a dis-
criminatory effect are violative of the Fair Housing Act, there is no
uniformity as to which of the various effect tests to apply. Also, there is
no uniformity as to the standard of justification which the defendant
must meet in a case where the prima facie case doctrine is employed.
Presently, there are four models of discriminatory effect. In Arlington
1J,282 the first model, the court held that at least under some circum-
stances a violation of the Fair Housing Act can be established by a
showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory
intent. However, the court noted that not every action which produces
discriminatory effects is illegal. The court in Arlington II outlined four
critical factors which are to be applied in determining whether evi-
dence of discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish a violation.
Those factors are: (1) how strong is the plaintiffs showing of discrimi-
natory effect; (2) is there some evidence of discriminatory intent,
though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington
v. Davis; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action com-
plained of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or
merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual prop-
erty owners who wish to provide housing.283 In Arlington II, the court
failed to apply the prima facie case doctrine and merely set up a bal-
275. Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976).
276. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
277. E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. City of
Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1094, aff'd as modofed, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1720 (1982); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
279. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
280. Id. at 431.
281. 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).
282. 558 F.2d at 1290.
283. Id.
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ancing test involving the four factors.28 4 The Arlington II test has two
major weaknesses: it does not adequately assess the strength of the par-
ties' interests, and it makes the outcome depend upon the number of
factors supporting each party rather than on the weight of those fac-
tors.285 Also, the fourth Arlington II factor concerning the nature of
the relief sought has no relationship to a finding of discriminatory ef-
fect. The only other circuit court to explicitly adopt the Arlington II
test was the Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Town of Clarkton.286 However,
in United States v. Mitchell,287 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Arlington
II language concerning the perpetuation of segregation as a discrimi-
natory effect, but Mitchell failed to apply the Arlington II four-prong
test.
With the exception of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, which apply
the Arlington II test, the other circuit courts apply some form of the
prima facie case doctrine. In United States v. City of Black Jack,288 the
second model, the Eighth Circuit applied the prima facie case doctrine
and found a discriminatory effect. Upon a finding of discriminatory
effect, the court held that the burden shifted to the defendant "to
demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a compelling
government interest." '289 The Black Jack court characterized the test as
an equal protection test even though the case was brought exclusively
under the Fair Housing Act. The Court then outlined a three-part test
for determining a compelling governmental interest. Those factors are:
"(1) whether the ordinance in fact furthers the governmental interest
asserted. . . , (2) whether the public interest served by the ordinance is
constitutionally permissible and is substantial enough to outweigh the
private detriment caused by it. . . . and (3) whether less drastic means
are available whereby the stated governmental interest may be
attained. 290
In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,291 the third model, the Third
Circuit rejected the Black Jack compelling interest test, noting that it is
too heavy a burden for Title VIII defendants and that the compelling
interest test should only be used for equal protection claims.292 Under
the standard enunciated in Rizzo, once a discriminatory effect has been
284. See Comment, supra note 253, at 332-33.
285. See Comment, supra note 20, at 410-14.
286. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); for an eloquent application of the Arlington If factors in a
case following Smith v. Town of Clarkton, see Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va.
1982).
287. 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978).
288. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
289. Id. at 1185.
290. Id. at 1186-87. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
291. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
292. Id. at 148.
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established, the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
showing that the defendant's conduct serves "in theory and practice, a
legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant, and that the
defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be
adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discrimi-
natory impact." '29 3 Also, the court noted that the Title VIII standard of
proof criteria must emerge on a case by case basis. To complicate mat-
ters even further, the Rizzo court mentioned without any explanation
that the Arlington II factors may be relevant.294
In Williams v. Matthews Co.,295 the fourth model, the Eighth Circuit
noted that once the plaintiff established a prima facie case, "the burden
then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the plaintiff's rejection." Williams was decided
before Black Jack; however, Williams was later relied on in Smith v.
Anchor Building Corp.296 Therefore, it is quite unclear as to which test
the Eighth Circuit will apply.
In summary, the circuit courts are in accord that some form of dis-
criminatory effect may establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
However, the circuit courts are split as to whether to apply the prima
facie case doctrine or to apply the Arlington H balancing test. Some
courts confusingly make reference to both tests. The courts applying
the prima facie case doctrine are in considerable disarray as to what is
the defendant's burden of justification. The issue is ripe for clarifica-
tion by the Supreme Court.
C. Section 1982 Standard
The circuit courts are split on the standard of proof issue under sec-
tion 1982. In Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc. ,297 the Ninth
Circuit squarely held that discriminatory impact is sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case under section 1982. However, in Denny v.
Hutchinson Sales Corp. ,298 the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff must
prove discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of section 1982.
While the issue is still open, there are strong indications that proof of
intent or purpose will be required under section 1982. In General Build-
ing Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,299 the Court held that
proof of discriminatory intent or purpose was required to establish a
293. Id. at 149.
294. Id. at 149 n.36.
295. 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir. 1974).
296. 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976).
297. 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231
(8th Cir. 1976).
298. 649 F.2d 816, 822 (10th Cir. 1981).
299. 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1982).
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violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Since sections 1981 and 1982 have
been interpreted similarly, General Building Contractors strongly sug-
gests that proof of intent or purpose will be required under section
1982.
In City of Memphis v. Greene,3" the Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the standard of proof issue; however, the Court declined to do so.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White pointed out that section 1982
requires some showing of discriminatory intent.30  However, the dis-
sent of four Justices noted that "[tihe plain language does not suggest
an intent requirement, because it does not condition a violation of sec-
tion 1982 on the motivation of any person or persons."3 °2
V. Conclusion
If the national policy of fair housing is to be implemented, private
litigants must be prepared to skillfully attack the widespread discrimi-
natory practices. Given the complexity of housing discrimination liti-
gation, there is little room for fundamental mistakes. With a firm grasp
of the basic principles of procedure, standing, and standard of proof,
housing litigants will be armed with the fundamental tools to begin the
attack.
Housing litigants must carefully analyze the various procedural ave-
nues available. Before a case is heard on its merits, the standing and
procedural hurdles must be overcome. Many of the common proce-
dural problems may be avoided by careful adherence to the procedural
statutes.
The recent standing cases have substantially broadened the class of
prospective housing litigants, particularly under the Fair Housing Act.
Litigants proceeding under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and 1983,
and the constitutional provisions must remain cognizant of the Warth
problem.
The housing litigant must have a basic knowledge of the standard of
proof problems in order to select the most appropriate provisions under
which to proceed. Wise litigants will know the ultimate standard of
proof prior to instituting and developing litigation. Given the trends
requiring proof of intent under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and 1983
and the constitutional provisions, the Fair Housing Act appears to be
the most potent weapon and should be used whenever it is available. If
proceeding under the Fair Housing Act, litigants must be familiar with
the particular effects test model applied in the jurisdiction.
Given the blatant neglect of fair housing enforcement by the present
300. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
301. Id. at 135.
302. Id. at 148 n.14.
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federal authorities, private litigants are left with almost the total re-
sponsibility of fulfilling the national policy of fair housing. The private
litigant must not fail while carrying such a heavy responsibility.
J. MICHAEL McGuINNESS
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